Thomas Friedman's new book [The Lexus and the Olive Tree] should he read by all who have an interest in global and/or international studies. Educators at all levels would find the book informative and perspective forming.

Friedman's thesis is that the globalization and democratizing of finance, information and technology is the emerging defining system for the post-Cold War period. The Internet, satellite television, and the cell phone (among other technological advances) have made it impossible for governments to control information flow (and, perhaps, the thinking of their people) and the decisions of individuals about where to put their money. Billions of dollars are transferred daily with the click of a mouse in response to varied economic, political or cultural stimuli across the globe.

Governments around the world must attend to what Friedman describes as "the electronic herd" (moneylenders, international investors, multinational corporations,influential individuals such as Bill Gates and George Soros and many more) if they want to be among "the winners" for their people. Every country can be a winner if it puts on the "golden straightjacket For Friedman, this means the decentralizing of government, the privatizing of industry, and the elimination of tariffs and other obstacles to foreign investment. Governments must also adhere to internationally established standards in accounting and auditing, as well as the effective regulation of their financial market to protect the rights of shareholders, and to laws that actually encourage individuals to risk bankruptcy.

Friedman is enough of a student of history to recognize that globalization is not new, but globalization since 1989, beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall, represents "the inexorable integration of markets, nation- states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before. It is happening in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations and nation-states to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than even before."

In fact, one of the more interesting parts of Friedman's book describes the United States as having the proper mix of political and cultural characteristics to have enabled it to drive globalization in this new chapter in world history. [His list] sounds much like the lists in 1950s textbooks giving the reasons for the industrial revolution in the United States and for the nation's relative prosperity after World War II.

Friedman uses gas stations as a metaphor for the American form of capitalism-more deregulated and efficient than the capitalism found in Europe, Asia, Russia and the third world. The result is cheaper gas and fewer employees at the gas station since the customer is both attendant and driver. Countries in Europe and Asia are uncomfortable with unregulated capitalism and consider the social contract (longer vacations, lifetime employment, more government benefits, socialized medicine) between their citizens and government as a form of government regulation that is more humane than the US system. If Friedman is right, the Anglo-American form will prevail once other countries recognize that they no choice but to face the pain of deregulation if they expect to compete and serve their citizens in the long run.

To Friedman globalization is a wonderful opportunity for all people to raise their standards of living and increase personal freedoms, including access to information and economic options. He does, however, recognize that globalization can undermine the attachment of people to their olive trees (a sense of place, community, culture and historical roots.) His solutions to this tension are filled with ambivalence and not welldeveloped, a weakness in the book. This ambivalence is apparent throughout the book, since Friedman obviously has a kind of adolescent enthusiasm about globalization and the world's great cultures and civilizations. For example, he admires France for preserving the beauty of the French countryside at the expense of efficient farming. Still, he says he would not buy France if France were a stock offering. Friedman also overlooks another downside of globalization in the United States (decline of status, population and economic vitality of many US cities) and misses an opportunity to compare this development with the far greater government support and respect for cities in Europe and Asia. The market-driven urban sprawl in the United States is rapidly depopulating our cities' capacities to compete with the suburbs. The price is lack of common identity (olive tree) in our major metropolitan regions.

Is Friedman's globalization a new form of manifest destiny (with greater sensibility about assisting the less successful) as we enter the 21st century? People in most counties want Hollywood movies, American television, big Macs and Disney. Is this good for the world or the United States? Does this increase our arrogance, and xenophobia about the benefits of other cultures?

Even Friedman admits that India's testing of nuclear weapons, which resulted in a downgrading of India's economy by Moody's Investment Service from 11 investment grade" to a "speculative" grade, was as much about respect for India as it was about the danger of nuclear weapons. A better understanding of other cultures is still a necessary ingredient for world peace, even if the world is integrated economically and culturally in ways that would have been unrecognizable in 1945. History and culture will continue to show up in the historical mirror in large countries like India and China and in smaller countries like Serbia, South Africa and Israel. The Olive Tree remains a strong countervailing force beneath the surface of globalization, even in countries trying to find the right size "golden straightjacket."

If so much control of world's future is in the hands of the "electronic herd," then local democracy and a sense of community (the olive tree) are in great danger. Friedman's material view of culture could discourage, not encourage, a sense of efficacy in local communities if the most influential individuals in the world care more about setting rules for investment than for civic virtue. Why bother getting involved in politics if these impersonal, non-elected forces have more power than elected officials at the local and national level? Friedman raises this question, in a rather cavalier and clever manner, in his fictitious account of Microsoft's purchase of the Federal Government of the United States, along with Bill Clinton's acceptance of a vicepresidency at Microsoft.

Others have raised questions about Friedman's belief that globalization is certain to raise the standard of living for every country if the governments throughout the world will play by the rules of the "electronic herd." For example, a recent report of the United Nations Development Program concluded that the rules of globalization need major changes to assist the 60 countries whose economies are worse off since 1980. This report points to the advantages of the United States and other wealthy industrial countries that hold 97 percent of all worldwide patents. An American needs to save one Month's salary to buy a computer. Compare this to a citizen of Bangladesh who must work for eight years to purchase the same hardware. There remain many people, both in the larger world and in the United States, who need help and a larger safety net than Friedman appears to advocate; indeed, what Friedman means by the necessary safety net to assist "the losers" is not altogether clear.

It is not that Friedman is insensitive to these issues and questions, but he does not give them the necessary analysis for the more fortunate beneficiaries of the new globalism to take seriously. Finally, has history really ended (originally suggested by Fukuyama), or begun anew, as Friedman argues in his introduction, "The World is only Ten Years Old"? While the globalization Friedman is describing is faster and different in nature due to technology and the increasing globalization of financial services, Ben Friedman, professor of Political Economy at Harvard, says that physical goods account for 71 percent of US exports and 84 percent of US imports." This sounds more like our traditional notions of international trade prior to the new globalization. Still, the Harvard Friedman agrees with Thomas Friedman that globalization of financial services and labor is increasingly dramatic, and their continuing expansion will depend on electronic communication. Economic growth of developing and developed countries will depend even more than in the 1990's on whether financial services continue to be saleable across the borders of nation states.

Let us hope that Friedman is right that the new globalization about which he is so optimistic will increase individual freedom and prosperity. I am not so sure, but educators have a responsibility to help their students understand an uncertain global future.