Teaching Materials - Lesson - The China Seminar

THE QUESTION OF TIBET
A. Tom Grunfeld

Thanks to an extraordinarily successful public relations campaign. Tibet has become the cause of the day. A clever play on the passions stirred by a volatile mixture of nationalism and religion and the diminished stature of the Beijing government after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre has creates a Shangri-la in American popular culture. While it inflames emotions and captures media attention, this illusory Tibet bears very little attention to the Tibet of historical reality.

The gap between Shangri-la and Tibet is so enormous that even the most basic details are in dispute. For example, how many Tibetans live in Tibet: 4 million or 6 million? What exactly constitutes Tibet: the entire area of ethnic Tibetan inhabitation, or a region, about half that size of which the Dalai Lama had political control in 1950? Was Tibet historically independent, or was it an "integral" part of China for centuries? To most people the answers lie not in history but on which of the political divide they place themselves. As a result, American attitudes toward Tibet are shaped more by emotion than by knowledge.

A Tibetan History Lesson
Tibet evolved into an entity resembling a state in the seventh century with the adoption of a singe monarch, state-sponsored religion, and a written language. Five hundred years later the Mongols swept across Eurasia, conquering both China and Tibet. They allied themselves in the latter with the Gelupga sect of Tibetan Buddhism, forging a "priest-patron" relationship in which the Mongols offered military protection in return for spiritual guidance from the Tibetans. TheMongols also created the rule of the Dalai Lama (Mongol for "monk with ocean-like wisdom). Consequently, Tibet became a part of the Chinese state, albeit a Chinese state ruled by Mongols.

The ethnic Manchu Qing dynasty (1644-1912) incorporated Tibet into a greater China, ruling loosely through an imperial commissioner who involved himself in Tibetan affairs only rarely. On occasion the Qing emperor sent armies to Tibet to defend it against foreign invasion.

In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries, Tibet became a pawn in the "Great Game" of British and Russian imperialism. To formalize relationships and borders, the British called a tripartite (Britain, Tibet, and China) conference in Simla, India in 1913. The pragmatic thirteenth Dalai Lama, who had unilaterally declared Tibet's independence the year before, indicated that he was willing to sign a treaty separating Tibet into two parts: "Outer Tibet" under Chinese sovereignty, and "Inner Tibet" under Chinese "suzerainty." This later status was considerably less than sovereignty; it implied Tibetan domestic autonomy but not outright independence. The treaty was never implemented because of China's objections.

With the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1912, several parts of the Chinese empire, including Tibet, became de facto independent until 1949. While Tibet had the attributes of independence (including a currency, army, foreign relations, and a government), it never had the de jure independence since numerous international treaties recognized suzerainty over all of Tibet.

The Communists and Tibet
With the coming to power of the Chinese Communist Part and the declaration of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, a strong central government was reestablished in China along with a determination to regain the outer boundaries of Qing rule.

Although the rulers of Tibet and China bad contacts over the centuries through marriage, invasion (by both sides), and treaties, Tibet had always enjoyed a high degree of autonomy, and Chinese rule was spare. This changed dramatically when Tibet, for the first time, became fully integrated into a Chinese state in 1951. Although the Chinese Communist Party regarded Tibet as a politically "integral" part of China, it also considered it so profoundly different that it insisted on a "treaty" on its incorporation into China. Moreover, because of Tibet's different culture, language, religious system, and especially, functioning government, Beijing opted for evolutionary changes in Tibet.

In the 1950s Chairman Mao Zedong, the revolutionary ideologue who had brought communism to China, insisted on a policy of alliance with ruling aristocratic class in Tibet while maintaining the Dalai Lama's theocratic government, along with the feudal social and economic structure. On two occasions during this decade the Dalai Lama left Lhasa, the regional capital, and voluntarily returned, based largely on Mao's commitment to maintain the status quo.

This remarkable policy was designed for political Tibet, the area that officially became known and the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in 1965, which roughly encompasses the thirteenth Dalai Lama's Inner Tibet. The other Tibetan ethnic areas (Outer Tibet, now comprising mainly the provinces og Quing-hai and Sichuan) were considered Chinese regions.

Mao was willing to forego ideology for pragmatism because he believed any sudden change to Tibetan society would foster rebellion. Yet in the Tibetan regions outside the TAR the people and societies were culturally identical to those within the TAR. Why Mao or other Chinese officials never took heed of this still remains a mystery. Thus, when the party's political campaigns unfolded in ethnic areas they resulted in rage against the disruption of the Tibetan traditional way of life. Minor insurrections in Sichuan erupted into open revolt in 1956 and spread westward toward Lhasa.

As the rebellion grew, its leaders sought external support; the United States Central Intelligence Agency was only too glad to assist, viewing Tibet as another opportunity to destabilize the Chinese Communist government in its cold war crusade. During an abortive revolt in March 1959 the Dalai Lama and between 50,000 and 60,000 Tibetans fled into exile to Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, and, especially, India.

To Beijing, the Dalai Lama and the aristocrats had voided the treaty, and the TAR could be treated as any other Chinese province. The ensuing campaign and massive social transformation would erode the traditional Tibetan way of life and rule from Lhasa. This was especially true during the Cultural Revoltion, when, at its height from 1966 to 1969, Chinese Red Guards - with the aid of some Tibetan Red Guards - attempted cultural genocide, including the destruction of almost every religious building in Tibet. The various political campaigns during the Cultural Revolution also led to many direct and indirect deaths throughout China, although Tibet was never specifically targeted. The Dalai Lama cites the figure as 1 million Tibetan deaths but this number is only an estimate, likely used to shock people into supporting his cause. We will probably never know the exact figures.

The Dalai Lama settled into exile in the northwestern Indian hill station of Dharamsala and established a government-in-exile. During the 1960s little recognition was given to the exiled Tibetans (to date no government has recognized the Dalai Lama's exile administration). But at that time these were secondary matters; the major objectives were settling the refugees in their new homes and fighting the guerilla war inside Tibet, although, officially, the Dalai Lama does not condone violence. The CIA's support had led the Tibetans to assume-wrongly-that the world's most powerful nation would help them achieve their objective: independence. The CIA had no such intention, seeing the Tibetans as merely useful allies in harassing Beijing.

With the Nixon administration's decision in 1971 to "tilt" China towards the United States as part of America's Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union, the Tibetans found themselves alone in their request for self-determination. It also marked an end to the guerilla struggle, since the Tibetans had been unable to create a sustainable, independent military force after 15 years of fighting. That same year a split in the Chinese leadership led to changes in government policies throughout the mainland, including Tibet. A few years later after Mao himself dies in 1976, government policies were further moderated. A series of events were now set in motion that came tantalizingly close to a compromise solution to the Tibet issue.

Compromise and Error
China's publicly admitted that past policies toward Tibet has been harmful in the region, Tibetans were appointed to positions with at least a modicum of power, and refugees were allowed to visit families in Tibet. In February 1978, the Panchen Lama, second only to the Dalai Lama in the Tibetan hierarchy, was released from 14 years of house arrest and prison.

In December 1978, a new round of contacts between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government began. These talks resulted in negotiations between representatives of the Dalai Lama and Beijing and an agreement to send several Tibetan-exile investigative delegations to Tibet.

In 1980 Chinese Communist Party leader Hu Yaobang traveled to Tibet. He was stunned by what he witnessed (he allegedly told party officials that Chinese rule was "colonial" in nature) and immediately ordered changes, including allowing more cultural freedom and scheduling the withdrawal of many Chinese officials. These changes (only partially implemented), and the acknowledgement that Tibet had serious problems, helped set a climate for the rejuvenation of Tibetan culture.

Disappointingly, in the second half of the 1980s talks between the Dalai Lama and Beijing began to stall for reasons still undisclosed. This presented a problem for the Dalai Lama, who until then had exerted little energy in winning support around the world, calculating that as long as he was negotiating with Beijing, the intervention of a third world force was unnecessary. However, if Beijing walked away from the talks, how was the Dalai Lama to gain its return? The answer was to promote the Tibetan cause in the hopes of creating international (read American) pressure to push the Chinese back to negotiations.

Meetings of Tibet supporters began to be held around the world, and a plan was reached to create what came to be known as the Tibet Lobby. The plan was put together by members of the Dalai Lama's government and their foreign advisors. It called for the internationalization of the Tibet issue through the recruitment of lobbying and public relations firms and by gaining media attention and generating popular support on such issues as independence, religious freedom, human rights and the environment; it was hoped that the combination would force governments to pressure Beijing.

The details were straightforward: the Dalai Lama would travel more and make the trips openly political, and support groups would be established in the United States, to lobby governments on the Dalai Lama's behalf; peaceful civil disobedience inside Tibet would be encouraged; and the Dalai Lama would continue to call for talks that offered flexible terms to Beijing.

These efforts proved immensely successful, especially after the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama that same year, and the Hollywood's elite's adoption of Tibet as a cause. Support groups were established in dozens of countries, and parliaments began passing resolutions that attacked Chinese human rights abuses and expressed support for the Dalai Lama - and sometimes an independent Tibet.

These efforts were especially successful in the United States, where members of Congress, already angry at China over issues such as nuclear proliferation, trade imbalances with the United States, prison labor, and human rights, readily took up the Tibet cause as another cudgel in their crusade against China. Congressional hearings were held, amendments condemning "human rights violations" in Tibet and labeling it an "occupied country" were added to bills unrelated to Tibet or China, and the Dalai Lama was invited to speak at congressional hearings.

During one of these hearings in September 1987, at which the Dalai Lama was proposing a compromise plan for Tibet, the first demonstrations in nearly three decades broke out in Lhasa. Police efforts to disperse the crowds resulted in bloodshed. There is no proof that the demonstrations were instigated from outside Tibet; Tibetan animosity over Chinese rule was real enough. However, news of the Dalai Lama's congressional appearance was available through the Voice of America and BBC; Chinese radio had denounced his activities while leaflets were clandestinely distributed in Lhasa. Moreover, Tibetans evidently made no distinctions between congressional hearings and official United States policy, which has always been not to recognize the independence of Tibet or support the Dalai Lama in his efforts to accomplish that goal. From Tibet it looked like America was in its corner.

Despite the unrest, Chinese officials continued to offer incentives for the Dalai Lama's return (such as granting greater autonomy and allowing the Dalai Lama to live in Lhasa), and responded in kind. Speaking to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France in June 1988, the Dalai Lama restated many of his earlier concessions but included a bombshell - saying, for the first time publicly, that he would return to a Tibet that was less than independent. He proposed a variation on suzerainty; China would handle all foreign affairs and defense while Tibetans would maintain relations with other nations in "fields of religion, commerce, education, culture, tourism, science, sports and other nonpolitical activities."

Chinese officials were caught off guard, and after some initial positive responses the official reply was negative. The international clamor and continued unrest inside Tibet had revitalized a policy debate in Beijing between moderates, who argues for compromise, more freedom for Tibetan cultural practices, and the return of the Dalai Lama, and hard-liners, who were just as happy breaking off ties to the Dalai Lama, waiting for him to die, and imposing further restrictions on traditional Tibetan way of life, with greater efforts toward assimilation.

The 1980s had seen an increase in the use of the Tibetan language, the rebuilding of temple and monasteries, and an overall advancement of Tibetan culture. Moderate government officials in Beijing were willing to solidify these policies through a deal with the Tibetan spiritual leader, the time seemed just right.

With the sudden death of the Panchen Lama in January 1989, the moderates took a bold step of inviting the Dalai Lama to participate in religious funeral ceremonies in Beijing while privately informing him that political issues would also be discussed. It seemed the opening he was seeking: direct talks with the Chinese leadership. The Dalai Lama's advisers were not willing to take the risk, however. And Beijing apparently would not allow him to visit Lhasa. So in the end he did not go, perhaps making the gravest error of his political life.

The Hard-Line Strengthened
The inability of the moderates to produce the Dalai Lama and negotiate a deal, the continuing demonstrations in Tibet, and the escalating China-bashing around the world all strengthened the hand of the hard-liners in Beijing. In March 1989, after yet another protest that resulted in brutal Chinese suppression, martial law was declared in Tibet; it would last until May 1990.

A brief hint of renewed talks came in 1993 when Beijing apparently attempted to gain the Dalai Lama's assistance in Chinese government- sponsored search for the eleventh Panchen Lama. A search had begun on the death of tenth Panchen Lama in 1998, but controversy ensued over who could name his successor - the government of China or the Dalai Lama. The details surrounding this controversy remain generally clouded in mystery. It is clear that in 1995 the Dalai Lama announced that a boy had been selected, and Beijing, angered at being preempted in making the announcement, denounced the Dalai Lama's choice, arrested the boy and his family and selected and enthroned its own candidate. The Dalai Lama's candidate remains under house arrest.

Within Tibet, repression by Chinese authorities has continued. Beijing has outlaws pictures of the Dalai Lama, welcomed ethnic migration into Tibet, increased security personnel at Tibetan monasteries, inhibited religious practices and forced monks and Tibetan officials to undergo "patriotic" retraining. These policies have led to continued and growing animosity toward Chinese rule, as well as public expression of Tibetan nationalism that have included several bombings in Lhasa over the past two years.

Waiting for the Dalai Lama
The Dalai Lama is acutely aware of the pressure of the time. Although he probably has little choice but to establish the international campaign on Tibet's behalf, it has clearly been a failure for those intended to help. Ironically, the congressional hearing, the rock concerts, and the Hollywoodization of Tibet have creates a greater threat to Tibetan culture inside Tibet because they have strengthened the power of the Chinese hard-liners who argue that the Dalai Lama is not to be trusted and that Westerners want to break up China. Moreover, support from outside Tibet (including Radio Free Asia broadcasting in Tibet since December 1996) persuades Tibetans inside China that world governments support their cause and encourages them to continue their brave but essentially futile efforts against Chinese rule.

The Dalai Lama understands that he has no option but to continue to seek a compromise arrangement with Beijing. Holding out for independence may be a romantic option, but it is an unrealistic one. Pragmatically, like his predecessor, he is prepared, as he declared in an April 1999 interview, to "use [my] moral authority with the Tibetan people so they renounce their separatist ambitions"; autonomy would be the "best guarantee that Tibet's culture will be preserved."

This is an unpopular stance among many Tibetan exiles and their followers, who object to any compromise with Beijing. After four decades in exile, the Tibetan community is beginning to show regional, religious and political cracks.

The TAR itself has undergone dramatic changes in the last 40 years since the Dalai Lama left. It has roads, schools, hospitals and a Tibetan middle class; the overall material well-being of the people has increased, especially in urban areas. Lhasa supports two internet cafes, along with karaoke bars and discos. Religion is widely practiced, albeit with restrictions. Tibet is no longer closed, with some 50,000 tourists visiting annually. The members, and Tibetan recruits serve in the Chinese military.

To be sure, Tibetan officials wield less power than their Chinese counterparts. Moreover, the average income and literacy rates in Tibet are among the lowest in China, and animosity between Tibetans and Han Chinese is burgeoning (ethnic Chinese in search of economic opportunities are pouring into TAR to the point that they may soon outnumber the indigenous population). Between 600 and 700 Tibetans are held as political prisoners, many clergy who peacefully demonstrated against Chinese rule. In other words, the situation in Tibet is far more complex that the Tibet Lobby (and Chinese propaganda) portrays.

A Possible Deal
Independence for Tibet is possible only in the unlikely event of the breakup of the Chinese state. However, real Tibetan autonomy within the larger Chinese state, a situation that existed for several hundred years prior to 1951, may still be possible today. The Dalai Lama's public pronouncements have become clear indication he is reaching out to moderate officials, who while not currently directing policy towards Tibet, are still in the government. The moderates must also be pointing out to their colleagues that escalating restrictions on Tibetan culture in the TAR can only intensify anti-Chinese feelings among the Tibetans.

The recent controversy over a World Bank plan to relocate some of the poorest Chinese into areas of Tibetan inhabitation reflects the splits within the Dalai Lama's camp and the success of the Tibet Lobby - to the detriment of the Tibetans in Tibet. The Chinese government hears conciliation from the Dalai Lama and attacks the Tibet Lobby, leading it to question the sincerity of the Tibetan spiritual leader and making compromise even more difficult. And, while this odd alliance ("When you have a coalition of students in California with body piercings saying the same thing as Jesse Helms," The New York Times quoted a World Bank Official saying, "you are on a highway to nowhere") may have achieved some success by forcing the world Bank to reassess its plans, it also fueled the paranoia of Chinese officials who believe that the United States will do anything to hurt the Chinese state.

The outlines of a compromise can be surmised. China must openly embrace the Dalai Lama, welcome him back to Lhasa and Beijing, free political prisoners, stop Chinese emigration into Tibet, and adhere (in more than name) to its constitution, which allows for "autonomy" in regions such as Tibet. It must also give the Dalai Lama the freedom to speak out and control religion and culture, leaving the defense and foreign affairs to Beijing.

The Dalai Lama will be expected to dissolve the Tibetan independence movement and call on world governments to again acknowledge that Tibet is part of China. He must also give up the idea of a "Greater Tibet" encompassing the Chinese provinces of Sichuan, Gansu, Qinghai, and Yunnan that comprise Outer Tibet, although religious jurisdiction of monasteries in this area is surely possible.

Through such a deal Tibet could achieve stability along with cultural and religious freedom. The return of the Dalai Lama almost certainly lead to foreign investment and economic progress, lightening Beijing's financial obligations. Political repression could end. The Dalai Lama will be able to directly influence the lives of 4 million to 6 million Tibetans, rather than the 120,000 to 130,000 over which he has current authority.

Both sides will achieve their ultimate goals: for Beijing, territorial integrity, peace, stability, and economic development; for the Dalai Lama, the preservation of Tibetan culture and the freeing of political prisoners. The peaceful resolution of the Tibet issue is in the interests, and to the benefit, of both China and Tibet. The question is whether both sides have the courage to make the hard decisions that will allow them to move ahead.

A. TOM GRUNFELD is a professor of history at SUNY-Empire State College. He is the author of The Making of Modern Tibet (Armonk,N.Y.:M.E. Sharpe, 1996)